中小企業融資英文文章

　　改革開放20多年來，中國中小企業取得了長足的發展，對國民經濟的作用越來越不容忽視，可以說，沒有中小企業的發展，中國經濟就不可能取得真正的大發展。下面是小編帶來的，歡迎閱讀!

　　篇一

　　中國中小企業融資新招

　　Reports from China suggest that this technique is beginning to catch on among cash-strapped small and medium enterprises.

　　來自中國的報道顯示，這種手法在資金匱乏的中小企業當中很有市常

　　According to the South China Morning Post, three such companies in Jiangsu province – Changzhou Shende Seamless Tube, Changzhou Dongfeng Agricultural Machinery Group, and TingVoa Chang Group – have clubbed together to issue Rmb260m in joint three-year debt.

　　據《南華早報》***SCMP***報道，中國江蘇省的三家公司採用了這種方法：常州盛德無縫鋼管有限公司、常州東風農機集團有限公司和新華昌集團有限公司。這三家公司將發行2.6億元人民幣的3年期集合債券。

　　The three have credit ratings of triple B, triple B plus and A minus, respectively. But, due to support from the local government, their jointly issued bonds are triple A rated. So, is the dreaded collateralised debt obligation, that clever sleight of hand that helped drive the US housing market into the stratosphere, creeping into China?

　　這三家公司的信用評級分別為BBB、BBB+和A-。但由於得到當地政府的支援，它們所發行集合債券的評級被定為AAA級。這麼說，令人畏懼的債務抵押債券***Collateralised Debt Obligations, CDO***——將美國住房市場推上“巔峰”的聰明技巧——正在潛入中國嗎?

　　There’s a key difference to the US practice of bundling subprime mortgages and repackaging them: these Chinese bonds are backed by the government, albeit the local kind. So the question for investors isn’t whether the individual companies are triple A rated, it’s whether they think the local government will pay back the debt on their behalf if things go wrong.

　　但這一做法與美國將一些次級抵押貸款打包並重新包裝有一個關鍵的不同之處：這些集合債券得到了政府的支援，儘管只是地方政府。所以，投資者應關注的問題不是每家公司是否擁有AAA評級，而是一旦形成壞賬，當地政府是否會替發行人償還債務。

　　Local governments are not without their own debt worries. Last year the national audit office put the LG debt figure at about $1,650bn, while others think it could be much higher.

　　地方政府在債務方面也有自己的擔憂。中國國家審計署***National Audit Office***去年公佈的資料顯示，地方政府的負債額約為1.65萬億美元，而其他人則認為，實際負債額可能遠遠高於這個數字。

　　So would bond investors lending to SMEs, and in turn local governments, be throwing good money after bad? That depends on your view of China’s debt chain. Local governments largely owe money to big state-backed banks, which in turn are tools of the central government.

　　如此說來，債券投資者借錢給中小企業、進而借錢給地方政府，這是在沒完沒了地把錢往水裡扔嗎?這要取決於你如何看待中國的債務鏈。地方政府的主要債權人是大型國有銀行，而國有銀行又是中央政府的政策工具。

　　Many economists believe China’s banks will need some kind of recapitalisation as bad debts surface and non-performing loans rise. If managed correctly, that needn’t be a cause for alarm. At the moment, things don’t look too troubling. NPL ratios are low, and indeed falling.

　　許多經濟學家都認為，隨著壞賬浮出水面以及不良貸款的增加，中國的銀行需要進行某種形式的資本重組。如果處理得當，這無需成為拉響警報的理由。當前，情況看上去並沒有那麼糟糕。不良貸款率較低，實際上正在下降。

　　China’s SMEs need cash to keep going – they’ve been frozen out of normal credit channels for months. This method of funding helps spread the credit risks to investors, with a government backstop. So, economically, it is good news. And so long as China’s debt problem looks manageable, there’s no reason to believe that these triple A rated bonds are any different to any others. Investors got their cash back following a “credit event” on a similar bond this year.

　　中國的中小企業需要現金才能維持運轉，但它們被凍結在正常信貸渠道之外已有幾個月了。這種融資方式相當於是在政府的支援下，將信貸風險分散給投資者。因此，從經濟意義上說，這是一個好訊息。只要中國的債務問題看起來仍然可控，我們就沒有理由認為這些AAA級債券與其他AAA級債券之間存在任何差別。今年，一種類似的債券發生了“信貸事件”，不過後來，投資者還是拿回了自己的資金。

　　But – with China’s economy slowing, and its debt problem essentially impossible to quantify – it may still require a strong stomach to invest.

　　但是，隨著中國經濟增長放緩，加上其債務問題基本上無法量化，因此，要想繼續投資，可能還需要有一顆強大的內心。

　　篇二

　　中國中小企業融資難的出路

　　The Fix for China's Small-Business Cash Crunch

　　Beijing is worried about the country's shadow banking market and the risks it poses to the financial system. The central bank's recent liberalization of regulations on bank lending rates was in part an attempt to address the fact that a large proportion of the economy's financing activity happens in this grey or black market. Yet policy makers will have to go further if they want to address this growing threat to the country's economic stability.

　　中國政府擔心中國的影子銀行市場以及它給金融系統造成的風險。中國央行不久前放鬆對銀行放貸利率的監管在一定程度上是試圖應對一個事實，即中國經濟中的融資活動有很大一部分發生在這個灰色或黑色市場。然而，決策者如果想應對中國經濟穩定所面對的這一越來越大的威脅，則必須更進一步。

　　Shadow banking refers to illegal and unregulated lending practices through financing companies, trusts, street-side lenders or the like instead of through banks. This is mainly a phenomenon involving small-and-medium-sized enterprises ***SMEs***, which account for 80% of China's jobs and 60% of its GDP and yet struggle to secure bank loans. A recent study commissioned by the State Council estimates that 62% of China's small and micro businesses have no lending relationships at all with banks.

　　影子銀行業指的是不通過銀行，而是通過融資公司、信託機構、民間貸款商等機構進行非法及不受監管的放貸活動。這種現象主要牽涉到中小企業，這些企業為中國創造了80%的就業機會，並貢獻了60%的GDP，然而卻難以獲得銀行貸款。中國國務院不久前委託進行的一項研究估計，62%的中國小微企業與銀行完全沒有貸款關係。

　　When small companies can't borrow from banks, they borrow elsewhere, at much higher cost. Beijing understands this, and has tried to boost bank lending to small companies. But officials have not yet been able to overcome many of the incentives that contribute to banks' reluctance to do so. Loans to small businesses tend to be, well, small, and loan officers shy away from making them for the simple reason that it increases their workload. Why bust a gut making 10 loans when you can make one large one, particularly if it is to a state-owned enterprise with implicit government support?

　　當小公司無法從銀行貸款時，就只能另尋他途，而且要付出高得多的代價。中國政府明白這一點，並嘗試增加銀行向小企業提供的貸款。但官員們迄今一直未能克服促使銀行不願意向小企業放貸的眾多因素。向小企業發放的貸款規模往往較小，貸款官員避免發放這類貸款只是出於一個簡單的原因：他們的工作量會增加。要是你能發放一筆大額的貸款，幹嘛還要費勁巴拉地去發放10筆小額貸款呢，尤其是如果那筆大額貸款是發放給得到政府暗中支援的國有企業的話。

　　Last month, in an effort to get banks to lower their lending rates and boost lending generally, the central bank removed its floor on lending rates. But the practical effect, if any, will largely be to reduce the borrowing costs of state-owned enterprises. It won't lead to an increase in bank lending to SMEs or reduce their reliance on the shadow banking system, because it doesn't change the basic incentives for banks.

　　上個月，為了讓銀行降低貸款利率並在整體上增加放貸，中國央行取消了貸款利率下限。但這一舉措即便產生了實際效果，也只是降低了國有企業的貸款成本。此舉並不會導致向中小企業發放的貸款增加，或是降低中小企業對於影子銀行系統的依賴，因為它並沒有改變影響銀行放貸行為的因素。

　　Authorities were much closer to the mark when, in 2009, they allowed the creation of small loan companies, or SLCs. These are privately funded entities that make quick loans to small businesses as an alternative to traditional bank loans. They are not regulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission ***CBRC*** but they are overseen by provincial financial officials and follow government-approved lending standards.

　　當局在2009年時曾經更接近這個目標，當時他們允許建立小額貸款公司。這些公司是私人注資的實體，向小企業發放快速貸款，作為傳統銀行貸款的替代選擇。這些小貸公司不受中國銀行業監督管理委員會的監管，而是由省級金融官員主管，並遵循政府批准的放貸標準。

　　These loan companies are proving to be a good funding alternative for SMEs. From my research and discussions with loan-company owners, their loans are collateralized and demand is strong, and as long as they adhere to strict loan to value ratio rules, defaults are rare.

　　這些貸款公司成為很好的中小企業融資替代選擇。筆者進行的研究以及與貸款公司老闆的訪談顯示，這些公司的貸款都有抵押，需求很旺，而且只要他們堅持嚴格的貸款與價值比率規則，就很少有違約的情況。

　　However, current regulations limit the amounts SLCs can lend. Changes are needed for the program to make a serious dent in the funding shortfall the SME sector faces.

　　然而，目前的監管規定令小額貸款公司的貸款規模受到限制。要想顯著緩解中小企業面臨的融資難問題，這個方案還需要進行一些調整。

　　The first problem is that there are not enough small-loan companies. Beijing has ceased issuing new licences, effectively capping the number of SLCs. Since these tend to be smaller firms, the numerical cap also serves as a cap on available credit. This made sense when the program was in its pilot stage. But authorities should now feel confident expanding it.

　　首先，小貸公司的數量還不夠。中國政府已停發新牌照，實際上就是給小貸公司數量設限了。由於這些公司都是規模較小的公司，數量上的限制也就意味著貸款規模的限制。這樣做在試點階段是講得通的。但現在相關部門應該有擴大這個試點的信心了。

　　Second, restrictions on capital-raising leave small-loan companies without enough cash to meet demand for loans. The lending ceiling is the amount of a loan company's registered capital, plus borrowings from banks of up to 50% of equity. A loan company with equity of $20 million has its lending capped at $30 million, and the only way it can increase this cap is to raise more equity.

　　其次，對融資規模的限制規定令小貸公司沒有足夠的資金來滿足貸款需求。小貸公司放貸上限是其註冊資本加上從銀行獲得的不超過其股本50%的融資。一家股本為2,000萬美元的小貸公司貸款上限就是3,000萬美元，而提高這個上限的唯一辦法就是擴大股本。

　　As most SLCs face the same difficulties obtaining loans from banks as other small businesses, they end up lending only the capital put into them by their owners, which is not nearly sufficient to meet demand. Small-loan companies' collective lending is estimated at only 600 billion yuan ***$98 billion*** while the CBRC estimates a 2.67 trillion yuan gap between SME demand for loans and the supply. Loan-company owners are reluctant to pour too much capital into their firms because the process of adding equity capital is tied up with red tape, making it hard to make withdrawals later.

　　由於大多數小貸公司像其他小企業一樣難以從銀行獲得貸款，因此他們只能用所有者注入的資本來放貸，這遠不夠滿足目前的需求。小貸公司總體放貸能力估計僅有人民幣6,000億元，而銀監會估計中小企業貸款缺口為人民幣2.67萬億元。小貸公司所有者不願向其公司注入太多資本，因為增加股本的程式繁瑣，以後抽回資本有相當難度。

　　Beijing could allow small loan companies to borrow funds from their shareholders. Regulators have been justifiably cautious about this, since it would open the door to potentially large and rapid flows of capital into and out of loan companies, with destabilizing consequences for the broader industry.

　　中國政府可以允許小貸公司向股東融資。監管部門在這方面頗為審慎，這是可以理解的，因為這會開啟資金大規模快速進出這些貸款公司的大門，可能導致整個行業出現不穩定。

　　But the answer to that fear should be carefully tailored regulation, not a stifling of the industry. For instance, Beijing could cap shareholder loans at an amount equal to total invested equity. This would allow small-loan company executives the flexibility to put more capital into their firms via shareholder loans, but keep them from overextending themselves.

　　但要想解決這種擔憂，應當審慎制定監管規定，而不是扼殺整個行業。比如，政府可以將股東提供的融資規模限制在與其總股本投資規模相等的水平。這樣既可以讓小貸公司管理層以股東貸款的方式向公司注入更多資本，又能使其不至於過度擴張。

　　The shadow banking issue illustrates the extent of the challenges Beijing will face in reforming the financial system. But these challenges are not insurmountable. In cases such as small-loan companies, Beijing already has the tools it needs. As reform continues, authorities should look for opportunities to expand programs that already are working even as they undertake new liberalizations in other areas.

　　影子銀行問題顯示出中國政府在金融系統改革方面將面臨多大程度的挑戰。但這些挑戰並不是不能克服的。在小貸公司等問題上，北京需要的解決工具已經有了。隨著改革繼續深入，相關部門在其他領域實施新的開放措施的同時，也應當尋找擴大已經開始發揮作用的試點的機會。

　　相關文章拓展閱讀：小企業的衰落

　　During the recent years, countless small businesses have closed their doors and gone bankrupt. The corner grocer's , the small dress shop, the beauty salon, all are victims of market competition. Most of them are replaced by other small businesses that temporarily fill the needs of the neighbourhood but frequently end up, sharing the same fate of dissolution. More often, the market served by small businesses is taken over by large stores and shops. Businesses like the corner groceries and the dress shops have gone to big department stores and supermarkets, which not only keep adequate store and variety, but also provide better environment and service.

　　Apparently, it is increasingly difficult for small businesses to succeed in the present complex economic structure based, as it is, on small profit margins and tremendous sales volume. Lack of enough fund and poor management may be the chief cause of this tragedy. In addition, the quality of their commodities often causes suspicion of the customers as many small businesses are found to sell fake products for more profit, thus earning themselves an evil reputation. As to shopping environment and convenient service, they are unmentionable. All of the above speed up their bankruptcy.

　　Today, with the establishment of more and more groups and big corporations, how small businesses can survive in the tide of the market competitive economy hasbecome a hot social issue.